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Abstract 
 
We examine whether managers of public insurers use reporting discretion in capitalizing policy 
acquisition costs to manage earnings, and the extent to which accounting standards that provide guidance 
in practice could deter insurers from managing earnings. The accounting standard, ASU 2010-26, 
establishes a higher threshold at which acquisition costs meet eligibility for deferral. We expect this 
guidance to reduce the discretion afforded to managers to categorize acquisition costs as an asset. We 
find empirical evidence that public insurers manage earnings through capitalizing acquisition costs 
before ASU 2010-26, which became effective in 2012, but not after 2012. We also find that this earnings 
management is achieved primarily through capitalizing discretionary rather than nondiscretionary 
acquisition costs. Furthermore, the capitalized acquisition costs are more significantly associated with 
contemporaneous stock returns and future insurance premiums in the period after ASU 2010-26, 
suggesting that the capitalization of acquisition costs under the ASU 2010-26 guidance is more value 
relevant for investors. Taken together, our empirical results indicate that public insurers manage earnings 
through capitalizing rather than expensing acquisition costs, and that accounting standards that limit such 
discretion can help reduce this pattern of earnings management and increase the value relevance of the 
accounting information. 
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Earnings Management through Capitalizing Operating Costs: 
Evidence from Accounting for Policy Acquisition Costs in the Insurance Industry 
 
1.  Introduction   
This paper studies whether managers of public insurers use reporting discretion in deferred 
policy acquisition costs (DAC or DFPAC, the asset account associated with the costs of acquiring 
insurance contracts) to manage earnings, and the extent to which accounting standards that provide 
guidance in practice could deter insurers from managing earnings. This investigation is a valuable 
research area because statutory reports of insurers provide detailed data on the components of the 
policy acquisition costs, permitting an opportunity to measure managerial discretion.  
Policy acquisition costs in the insurance industry represent expenditures incurred in the normal 
course of business that are associated with activities relating to the acquisition of new contracts and 
the maintenance of existing contracts. Typical policy acquisition costs include agent commissions, 
general operating expenses, taxes, licenses and fees. While Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP) 
prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) require insurers to 
expense all acquisition costs immediately, GAAP permits insurers to capitalize certain costs as an 
asset account (i.e. DAC) and to amortize them over the life of related policies in proportion to 
expected future gross profits.1 This provides an empirical setting to investigate whether managers 
use the discretion of capitalizing certain operating costs to manage earnings.2 Capitalizing operating 
costs instead of expensing them immediately is considered to be a pervasive accounting practice 
                                                          
1 The economic magnitude of the amount of capitalized deferred acquisition cost (CDPAC) is significant for insurers. For 
our sample firms, the average CDPAC is 2% of total assets and 16% of total insurance premiums. See section 2.1 of the 
paper for more background information on policy acquisition costs in the insurance industry.  
2 There are several channels through which public insurers could use DAC to manage earnings including the capitalization 
of policy acquisition costs, overstating the persistence rate of insurance policies thus insufficiently amortizing DAC, and 
the failure to write down DAC assets when needed. Our focus is on the first channel of capitalization of policy acquisition 
costs. 
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(Schilit and Perler 2010). However, there is limited research about this earnings management 
mechanism.3 It is challenging to identify an empirical setting in which managers are provided 
discretion and the capitalized amount can be quantified. The accounting of policy acquisition costs in 
the insurance industry provides a suitable setting for this investigation. First, GAAP permits insurers 
to capitalize certain policy acquisition costs, and the capitalized amount of acquisition costs can be 
collected from public insurers’ 10-K filings, which allows a direct examination. Second, the detailed 
information of acquisition costs and insurance premiums disclosed in insurance statutory reports 
helps address the issue of measuring the level of accruals (deferrals) absent managerial bias in the 
area of earnings management (McNichols and Wilson 1988, McNichols 2000).4 Specifically, we are 
able to more clearly identify acquisition costs with a long-term benefit (and more likely should be 
capitalized) from other acquisition costs that might involve more discretion. 
We first examine whether managers of public insurers use reporting discretion in capitalizing 
acquisition costs to manage earnings.5 As mentioned earlier, GAAP permits insurers to capitalize 
certain policy acquisition costs as an asset. Earlier accounting standards (FAS 60) define DAC 
vaguely, describing such costs as those that “vary with and are primarily related to the acquisition of 
insurance contracts.” Thus, insurers and auditors were left to interpret which expenses were eligible 
for deferral, leading to a broad range of expenses being categorized as DAC. Given the vague 
                                                          
3 We note that there are two differing views on earnings management. While some researchers consider it to be 
opportunistic managerial behavior due to capital market pressure and/or managerial compensation contracting, others view 
it as an optimal reporting choice of managers to signal to the capital market about the future of the company (see, Beatty 
and Harris 1999 and Arya, Glover and Sunder 2003 for example). While we do not take a stand in the investigation of 
whether managers use discretion to manage earnings, we conduct value relevance tests of the capitalized policy acquisition 
costs (CDPAC) in further analyses to disentangle these two views. 
4 Accruals are expected future cash receipts and payments resulting from current and past transactions, and deferrals are 
expected future expenses and revenues resulting from current and past cash receipts and payments. 
5 The incentive to manage capital is not relevant in our setting because the Risk-Based Capital (RBC) requirements are 
enforced by the state regulators under statutory accounting standards. Statutory accounting standards, however, require 
expensing of all policy acquisition costs. Therefore, managers do not have the discretion to manage capital through the 
choice of capitalizing versus expensing policy acquisition costs. 
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definitions, it is plausible that managers of public insurers can use this accounting flexibility to 
manage earnings by capitalizing acquisition costs associated with unsuccessful acquisitions that did 
not result in long term benefits rather than expensing them right away.  
Next, we investigate the extent to which accounting standards that limit managerial discretion 
could deter firms from managing earnings. In October 2010, the FASB announced ASU 2010-26 to 
address concerns that the ambiguity of DAC-able costs allowed firms to abuse the DAC asset, and to 
create comparability within the insurance industry. This guidance became effective for fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 2011 (i.e. starting fiscal year 2012). ASU 2010-26 tightens the DAC 
definition to “costs that are related directly to the successful acquisition of new or renewal insurance 
contracts.” Specifically, the updated guidance imposes two restrictions on the acquisition costs that 
can be capitalized: the first is to limit the capitalized acquisition costs to only those associated with 
successful placement of business, and the second is to restrict the capitalization costs to be directly 
linked to top-line sales. We expect this guidance to create a higher threshold at which acquisition 
costs meet eligibility for deferral, which could reduce the discretion afforded to managers to 
categorize acquisition costs as DAC.  
Using a sample of public insurance companies during the period of 2009-2014, we examine 
whether the likelihood of managing earnings through capitalizing acquisition costs changes after 
ASU 2010-26 became effective in 2012. We focus on two proxies of earnings management – 
meeting or just beating last year’s earnings to avoid earnings decreases, and meeting or just beating 
analyst consensus earnings forecasts (Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 2003; Gunny 2010).  
Briefly, we find that capitalized acquisition costs are positively and significantly associated 
with the likelihood of meeting or just beating earnings benchmarks, suggesting that public insurers 
manage earnings through capitalizing rather than expensing acquisition costs. However, we only 
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observe this result in the period before ASU 2010-26. We do not find significant results, suggesting 
that public insurers manage capitalized acquisition costs to meet or beat earnings benchmarks in the 
period after ASU 2010-26 became effective.  
One notable feature of the insurance industry is that the insurers file statutory reports to state 
regulators in which they provide more details about the categories of acquisition costs and 
insurance premiums. This allows us to identify components of acquisition costs that involve more 
discretion. Of the insurance policy acquisition expenditures, sales commissions are paid as sales are 
placed, so most of these expenditures should be capitalized based on the matching principle. In 
contrast, insurers are likely to have more discretion over the accounting treatment for expenditures 
such as office expenses under the earlier accounting standards. We estimate a model that uses 
insurance premiums and components of acquisition costs as determinants of capitalized acquisition 
costs. Consistent with our expectation that ASU 2010-26 reduces managerial discretion in 
capitalizing more discretionary acquisition costs, the results show that capitalized acquisition costs 
are more (less) significantly associated with insurance premiums and sales commissions (office 
expenses) after ASU 2010-26 became effective.  
We then develop a prediction model of capitalized acquisition costs as a function of changes 
in insurance premiums, which indicate the success of the insurers’ policy acquisitions. From this 
prediction model, we derive discretionary and nondiscretionary components of capitalized 
acquisition costs. We predict and find evidence that earnings management is achieved primarily 
through capitalizing discretionary acquisition costs.   
We further analyze this pattern separately for private insurers, and fail to detect evidence of 
earnings management through managing acquisition costs. Given the differences in ownership 
structure, public insurers’ shareholders are more likely than private insurers’ shareholders to rely on 
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simple earnings benchmarks to evaluate firm performance (Beatty, Ke and Petroni 2002). As such, 
managers of public insurers might have stronger incentive to manage earnings. The results from 
this test using private insurers help address the concern that our results on public insurers are not 
attributable to earnings management, but simply a reflection of the underlying earnings distribution.  
We also analyze this pattern separately for life insurers and other insurers. Life insurers are 
those with the ratio of total assets of life insurance subsidiaries over total assets of the insurance 
holding company in the top tercile of the distribution. We find that our main empirical results are 
concentrated in public life insurers, suggesting that these companies have more reporting discretion 
in accounting for acquisition costs as a result of the nature of their business models. 
Finally, we investigate value relevance of the capitalized acquisition costs. There is a debate 
about the incentive to manage earnings. While some consider earnings management as 
opportunistic managerial behavior, others view it as an optimal reporting choice of managers to 
signal to the capital market about the future of the company (Arya et al. 2003). While the finding of 
public insurers managing earnings through capitalizing acquisition costs does not provide insights 
about the incentive to manage earnings, the value relevance tests of the capitalized policy 
acquisition costs (CDPAC) help disentangle these two views. If the accounting choice of 
capitalizing acquisition costs is a signal to the capital market about the future of the company or 
reflects the proper application of the matching principle, we would expect the capitalized 
acquisition amount to be positively associated with contemporaneous stock returns and future 
insurance premiums. On the other hand, if the accounting choice is a result of opportunistic 
reporting behavior, we would not expect capitalized acquisition costs to be value relevant. The 
results suggest that capitalized acquisition costs are more significantly associated with 
contemporaneous stock returns and future insurance premiums in the period after ASU 2010-26 
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relative to the period before, indicating that the capitalization of acquisition costs under the ASU 
2010-26 guidance is more informative about the insurers’ economic fundamentals.  
Taken together, our empirical results indicate that managers of public insurers manage 
earnings through capitalizing rather than expensing acquisition costs, and that accounting standards 
that limit such discretion can help reduce this pattern of earnings management. The empirical 
evidence from the value relevance analyses is more consistent with the view that the use of 
discretion to manage earnings through capitalizing acquisition costs captures opportunistic 
reporting behavior. 
Our paper makes two primary contributions. First, our study contributes to the literature on 
earnings management. We provide systematic empirical evidence about earnings management 
through capitalizing instead of expensing operating costs using a unique deferral account of public 
insurers. While prior studies document earnings management activities in the insurance industry, 
these studies mainly focus on loss reserves of property-casualty (P&C) insurers (e.g. Petroni 1992; 
Beaver et al. 2003). Given that life insurers incur significant up-front acquisition expenses in 
policy’s first-year premiums, our study provides some insights on understanding accounting 
practices that impact life insurers. While we also use detailed information disclosed in insurance 
statutory reports to isolate managerial discretion, our paper is distinct in that we study a specific 
accounting choice – whether to capitalize or expense operating costs.   
Second, the FASB is expected to issue an exposure draft on changes to the accounting for 
long-duration insurance contracts that revise the recognition and amortization model for DAC 
which includes specific guidelines of discount rates and amortization methods. Examining ASU 
2010-26 could generate insights into the extent to which providing more specific guidance in 
accounting standards is more informative for investors.  
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2.  Background, Related Research, and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Background 
 The focus of our investigation is accounting for policy acquisition costs in the insurance 
industry, the large upfront costs incurred by the insurance companies in acquiring new business and 
maintaining existing business.6 These costs are in the form of commissions to sales agents, 
underwriting, bonuses and other acquisition expenditure. While Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP) 
require insurers to expense all acquisition costs immediately, GAAP allows insurers to capitalize some 
costs as an asset (i.e. DAC), and amortize them over the life of related policies. The income effect of 
the policy acquisition costs capitalized versus expensed could be substantial. The matching principle 
requires that the acquisition costs be capitalized and amortized in proportion to the revenues earned in 
the future. However, given that capitalizing rather than expensing acquisition costs increases both 
reported earnings and assets, the uncertainty surrounding the estimation of the capitalized acquisition 
amounts provides managers with discretion to manage earnings.  
Before 2012, the primary accounting standard on accounting treatment for insurance 
acquisition costs is SFAS 60 – Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises (FASB 1982). 
SFAS 60 defines policy acquisition costs as “those costs that vary with and are primarily related to the 
acquisition of new and renewal insurance contracts.” With regard to the accounting treatment, SFAS 
60 states, “Acquisition costs should be capitalized and charged to expense in proportion to premium 
revenue recognized.”  
 In October 2010, the FASB announced ASU 2010-26 that addresses the diversity in practice 
regarding the interpretation of which costs relating to the acquisition of new or renewal insurance 
contracts qualify for deferral (FASB 2010). The guidance became effective for fiscal years beginning 
                                                          
6 We found nine out of ten firms describing DAC accounting in their 10-K ‘Summary of Significant Accounting Policies’ 
section. 
8 
 
after December 15, 2011 (i.e. starting fiscal year 2012) and allowed early adoptions.  
ASU 2010-26 tightens the DAC definition to “costs that are related directly to the successful 
acquisition of new or renewal insurance contracts” based on the following four criteria: (1) incremental 
direct costs of a successful contract acquisition; (2) portions of employees’ salaries and benefits 
directly related to time spent performing specified acquisition activities for a contract that has been 
acquired; (3) other costs directly related to the specified acquisition activities that would not have been 
incurred had that acquisition contract transaction not occurred; (4) advertising costs that meet the 
capitalization criteria in other US GAAP guidance (i.e., certain direct-response marketing).7 
 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 We first investigate whether managers of public insurers use reporting discretion in capitalizing 
acquisition costs to manage earnings. There is uncertainty surrounding the estimation of the capitalized 
acquisition amounts, which provides managers with discretion to manage earnings. As mentioned 
above, SFAS 60 was the earlier accounting standard on accounting treatment for insurance acquisition 
costs, which provided a vague definition on the characteristics of policy acquisition costs that qualify 
for deferral. This presents an opportunity for managers and auditors to interpret which expenses could 
be eligible for deferral, which could lead to a broad range of expenses being categorized as DAC. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that public insurers could use this discretion to manage earnings by 
capitalizing policy acquisition costs as DAC.8 
                                                          
7 See EY (2018): “Accounting for certain life insurance and annuity products.” 
(https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwiwlcfWsLngAhXp7IMKHcfC
DeoQFjABegQICBAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ey.com%2Fpublication%2Fvwluassetsdld%2Ffinancialreportingdev
elopments_00362-181us_lifeannuity_25january2018-v2%2F%24file%2Ffinancialreportingdevelopments_00362-
181us_lifeannuity_25january2018-v2.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3Y7jNfq17BNbRsgoYD_Ao-) 
8 Observing AAER for anecdotal evidence, there is a case that the SEC filed a civil fraud action lawsuit in 2004 against 
three former officers of New England Financial (NEF), a subsidiary of MetLife, Inc., for misclassifying some overhead 
expenses as sales commissions.  This resulted in the improper capitalization of over $100 million in expenses, the direct 
result of which was the publication of materially false financial statements of MetLife, the holding company 
9 
 
The earnings management proxies we use are the incidences of meeting or just beating earnings 
benchmarks, specifically last year’s earnings and analyst consensus earnings forecasts. We focus on 
these benchmark beating proxies because studies of earnings management suggest that the 
disproportionate likelihood of meeting or just beating earnings benchmarks is a significant indication 
of earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999).  The 
two most important earnings benchmarks are earnings of prior years and analyst consensus earnings 
forecasts. Survey evidence also suggests CFOs believe that meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is 
important (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005). We formalize the hypothesis below, stated in the 
alternative form: 
H1: Public insurers meet or just beat earnings benchmarks through capitalizing rather than expensing 
policy acquisition costs.  
 The second objective of our study is to assess the extent to which accounting standards that 
provide more guidance in practice could deter firms from managing earnings. In October 2010, the 
FASB announced ASU 2010-26 to address the diversity in practice regarding the characteristics of 
policy acquisition costs that qualify for deferral (FASB 2010). Specifically, ASU 2010-26 designates 
two features of the capitalized acquisition costs under GAAP. First, only acquisition costs that result 
from actually obtaining a contract (i.e. successful efforts) can be capitalized as DAC. Before ASU 
2010-26, companies usually did not differentiate between insurance policies that eventually were 
issued versus policies not taken. This is because insurance companies in general determined deferrable 
costs based on a block or portfolio of business. However, ASU 2010-26 requires companies to observe 
these costs at a contract level. Second, only these costs resulting directly from and essential to the 
successful contracts can be capitalized, such as sales commissions, third-party medical and inspection 
                                                          
(https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2489.pdf). 
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fees for successful contract acquisition, premium related taxes and assessment. In the past, however, 
some companies deferred expenses related to product development, administrative costs, rent, data 
processing equipment, training and/or market research etc. These expenses are no longer eligible for 
deferral under ASU 2010-26 because these are considered period costs that would have been incurred 
by the insurer regardless of the actual contract transaction.  
Therefore, ASU 2010-26 establishes a higher threshold at which acquisition costs meet 
eligibility for deferral. We expect the new guidance to reduce the discretion afforded to managers to 
categorize acquisition costs as DAC and thus deter managers from managing earnings through 
capitalization of policy acquisition costs. We formalize the hypothesis on the impact of ASU 2010-26 
below, stated in the alternative form: 
H2: Public insurers are less likely to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks through capitalizing 
rather than expensing policy acquisition costs post ASU 2010-26 relative to pre ASU 2010-26.  
 Finally, we investigate the incentive to manage earnings through capitalizing acquisition costs. 
There are two opposing views about the incentive of using discretion to manage earnings. The popular 
financial press and some scholars argue that earnings management is a reflection of opportunistic 
managerial behavior, which might arise from capital market pressure and managers’ risk associated 
with equity ownership or stock-based compensation. Prior research finds that meeting or beating 
earnings benchmarks has significant impacts on capital markets. In particular, firms that meet earnings 
benchmarks are rewarded with equity premiums, and firms that miss earnings benchmarks face 
significant declines in stock prices (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Kasznik and McNicholes 2002; 
Skinner and Sloan 2002).  The majority of managerial wealth is concentrated in their equity holdings 
and stock-based compensation, which are sensitive to stock prices. This could provide incentive for 
managers to use discretion to manage earnings and increase short-term stock price (Ofek and Yermack 
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2000; Cheng and Warfield 2005).    
On the other hand, some scholars view earnings management as an optimal reporting choice to 
signal to the capital market. Arya et al. (2003) argue that earnings management and managerial 
discretion are inherently linked to serve multiple functions. The dispersal of information across people 
is an important characteristic of a decentralized organization. As such, a managed earnings stream can 
convey more information than an unmanaged earnings stream.  Consistent with this view, Beatty and 
Harris (1999) document that public banks are more likely to use realizations of securities gains and 
losses to manage earnings than private banks, but that the portion of the current period realized 
securities gains and losses attributable to earnings management is more positively associated with next 
period’s earnings. Their findings suggest that managers of public banks manage earnings to reduce 
information asymmetry. 
We acknowledge that we are not able to make inferences on the incentive to manage earnings 
through the investigation of whether public insurers use discretion in capitalizing acquisition costs to 
manage earnings. However, the empirical analyses of the value relevance of the capitalized policy 
acquisition costs (CDPAC) are likely useful to help disentangle the two views.  If the accounting 
choice of capitalizing acquisition costs is a signal to the capital market about the company’s future 
performance or reflects the proper application of the matching principle, we expect that the capitalized 
acquisition amount would be positively associated with contemporaneous stock returns and future 
insurance premiums pre-ASU 2010-26 when managers have more discretion, and that these 
associations become weaker post-ASU 2010-26. Alternatively, if the accounting choice is a result of 
opportunistic reporting behavior, we do not expect to observe a significant association between the 
capitalized acquisition amount and contemporaneous stock returns and future insurance premiums pre-
ASU 2010-26, but anticipate these associations to become stronger post ASU 2010-26 when the 
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discretion is reduced. We formalize the hypotheses below, stated in alternative forms: 
H3a: If the use of discretion to capitalize acquisition costs to manage earnings is a signal to the 
capital market or is a proper application of the matching principle, CDPAC is positively associated 
with contemporaneous stock returns and future insurance premiums pre-ASU 2010-26, and these 
associations between CDPAC and value indicators are weaker post ASU 2010-26 relative to pre-ASU 
2010-26. 
H3b: If the use of discretion to capitalize acquisition costs to manage earnings reflects opportunistic 
reporting behavior, CDPAC is not associated with contemporaneous stock returns and future 
insurance premiums pre-ASU 2010-26, and these associations between CDPAC and value indicators 
are stronger post ASU 2010-26 relative to pre-ASU 2010-26. 
 
2.3 Related Research 
This study is closely related to the accounting choice literature in the insurance industry. A 
large body of research in earnings management uses accruals models, but the inferences drawn from 
these models are often confounded by the difficulty of measuring the level of accruals (deferrals) 
absent managerial bias (McNichols and Wilson 1988). To overcome this problem, McNichols (2000) 
suggests that researchers focus on a specific industry and model specific accruals where they could use 
institutional knowledge to characterize the non-discretionary and discretionary components. A number 
of papers adopt this strategy, focusing on loss reserves estimated by firms in the property-casualty 
(P&C) insurance industry. The loss reserve is the largest liability of P&C insurers, and the estimation 
of the reserve requires significant managerial judgment. Importantly, the total claim losses paid are 
disclosed in statutory reports, which could be used as an unbiased expectation of claim losses. Petroni 
(1992) uses the difference between the estimated expectation and the liability reported on the balance 
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sheet to measure managerial bias, and documents that managers of financially weak insurers 
underestimate their claim loss reserves relative to other insurers. Subsequent research employs a 
similar strategy, and documents that P&C insurers manage loss reserves to justify the competitive level 
of insurance premiums to regulators (Nelson 2000), avoid financial distress and regulatory 
interventions (Gaver and Paterson 2004), and for managerial compensation purposes (Eckles and 
Halek 2010). While insurers understate loss reserves to increase earnings in most cases, insurers 
sometimes overstate reserves for tax and regulatory reporting purposes (Gaver and Paterson 1999).  
Along those lines, Beaver et al. (2003) examine the relation between discretionary loss reserve 
accruals and the distribution of reported earnings of a sample of P&C insurers. They find that public 
insurers with small positive earnings understate loss reserves relative to those with small negative 
earnings, suggesting that public P&C insurers manage reserve accruals to avoid losses.  
Our study follows prior accounting literature in the insurance industry by leveraging 
institutional characteristics of the insurance companies. The detailed information on insurance 
premiums and acquisition costs disclosed in insurance statutory reports also permits us to more clearly 
identify the level of deferrals absent managerial bias. Our paper is distinct from prior literature in that 
we study a specific accounting choice – whether to capitalize or expense policy acquisition costs – 
which is not explored before.  
Our study is also related to the early literature on oil and gas accounting as well as the literature 
on R&D/ intangible accounting. For oil and gas accounting, the primary focus is on whether to use full 
cost (FC) or successful efforts (SE) methods to account for oil and gas exploration costs. Full-cost 
accounting allows capitalization of expenditures for oil and gas exploration regardless of the eventual 
success or failure of the venture. In contrast, successful efforts accounting only allows the 
capitalization of expenditures that result in discovery, which is similar in spirit to the guidance on 
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capitalizing policy acquisition costs under ASU 2010-26. The FASB issued an exposure draft that 
proposed the elimination of full cost in favor of successful efforts accounting for oil and gas companies 
on July 15, 1977. Just 13 months later, the SEC reversed the FASB position by recommending the 
continuance of both FC and SE accounting on August 29, 1978. Several papers evaluate the economic 
consequences of the accounting standard changes by examining stock market reactions to the 
announcements of the FASB exposure draft and the subsequent SEC rejection (Collins and Dent 1979; 
Dyckman and Smith 1979; Lev 1979; Collins, Rozeff and Salatka 1982). While the evidence is not 
conclusive, these studies generally find more negative market reactions to the announcement of the 
FASB exposure draft for the FC firms relative to the SE firms, and more positive market reactions to 
the SEC reversal announcement for the FC firms relative to the SE firms. With regard to the choice 
between the FC and SE accounting, prior research finds that firms’ accounting choices are consistent 
with efficient contracting. For example, Malmquist (1990) hypothesizes and finds that firms are more 
likely to choose full cost accounting if they are more levered, accessing public bond market, smaller, 
and with a greater proportion of resources devoted to drilling and exploration rather than producing. 
The R&D / intangible accounting literature focuses on the value relevance of intangible 
capitalization. Aboody and Lev (1998) document that annually capitalized software development costs 
are positively associated with stock returns. There is limited research on the accounting choice for 
R&D / intangible development expenditures because US firms are required to expense almost all 
R&D/ intangible development expenditures. Cazavan-Jeny, Jeanjian and Joos (2011) use a French 
setting where managers can choose to capitalize R&D expenditures under certain circumstances, and 
document that R&D capitalizers spend less on R&D, have more volatile R&D efforts, are smaller and 
more levered than firms that expense.9 They also find that capitalizers tend to capitalize R&D 
                                                          
9 Under French GAAP, managers can choose to capitalize R&D expenditures if they believe the outlay will lead to 
commercial success.   
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expenditures when they need to meet or beat earnings thresholds, but the inferences are clouded by 
other factors such as the managers’ ability to estimate the earnings power of R&D.10    
Our paper extends this line of research by identifying a unique empirical setting where the 
discretion the managers have about whether to capitalize or expense operating costs decreased after the 
new accounting standard was in effect.  The detailed information from insurance statutory reports also 
permits us to separate acquisition costs with a long-term benefit (and should be capitalized) from other 
acquisition costs that involve more discretion. 
 
3. Data and Sample  
To identify public insurance companies, we first obtain sample insurers from Compustat for the 
time period 2009 – 2014. After removing observations that have missing DFPAC (Deferred Policy 
Acquisition Costs), we hand collect observations that have missing CDPAC (Capitalized Deferred 
Policy Acquisition Costs) from the SEC Edgar and firms’ 10-K filings. The focus of our empirical 
analyses is on CDPAC. After deleting firm-year observations with missing information on CDPAC, IB 
(Income before Extraordinary Items) 11, and AT (Total Assets), we identify 125 sample firms and 605 
firm-year observations for the period 2009 – 2014. Table 1 describes the sample selection process for 
the empirical analyses.  
We use CRSP and I/B/E/S to obtain actual earnings per share and mean consensus analyst 
forecast closest to annual earnings announcement dates. To obtain firms’ statutory information (i.e. 
agents' and brokers' commissions and other types of policy acquisition costs), we utilize SNL Financial 
                                                          
10 Several papers examine managerial discretion in the allocation of purchase price to goodwill in M&A, and find some 
evidence of opportunistic allocation behavior. Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) find that CEOs whose compensation 
contracts contain earnings based bonuses are more likely to over-allocate the purchase price to goodwill, and Kubic (2018) 
documents that recording a measurement period fair vale adjustment post-acquisition allows firms to exceed earnings 
thresholds in a disproportionate number of cases. 
11 We utilize IB instead of NI (Net Income) variable since Compustat documents net income information in IB variable for 
insurance companies checking firms’ 10-K filings. 
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database. To link GAAP financial information with statutory financial information, we utilize SEC 
filings, firms’ websites, NAIC’s (National Association of Insurance Commissions) Listing of 
Companies reports from 2009 to 2014, and the NAIC’s company search website.12 Specifically, we 
first obtain company information from SEC 10-K filings or company’s websites. Then we compare the 
company information with the information from the NAIC’s company search website, so we can 
identify a firm’s statutory NAIC group number or company code. Lastly, to ensure that we capture the 
correct parent-subsidiary information, we adjust firm-year information based on the NAIC’s Listing of 
Companies reports considering firms’ merger and acquisition activities.    
Panel A of Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample. The average (median) 
CDPAC is 2% (0.7%) of total assets, the average probability to avoid earnings declines (INCREASE) is 
0.337, and the average probability to meet or just beat analyst consensus earnings forecast 
(MEET_BEAT) is 0.046.  
Panel B presents Pearson and Spearman pairwise correlation coefficients. The results show a 
significant, positive correlation between NI and CDPAC. We also note negative correlations between 
CDPAC and SIZE at the 1% level. For the overall sample period, the correlation between CDPAC and 
the likelihood of avoiding earnings decreases (INCREASE) is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10% level. 
Table 3 reports more descriptive statistics by separating the sample period into two periods 
before and after 2012, which is when ASU 2010-26 was adopted.  We do not find a significant 
difference in CDPAC before and after 2012. 
 
4. Research Designs and Empirical Results 
                                                          
12 https://eapps.naic.org/cis/companySearch.do  
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4.1 Earnings Management through Capitalizing Acquisition Costs and the Impact of ASU 
2010-26 
Stakeholders and regulators showed concerns about the diversity of practice in the insurance 
policy acquisition costs that were being capitalized and amortized (SOA 2011). We predict that public 
insurers use reporting discretion in DAC to engage in earnings management.  The accounting standard 
ASU 2010-26 tightened the definition of deferrable acquisition costs, which we predict to reduce 
insurers’ discretion to categorize acquisition expenditures as DAC. Our proxies of earnings 
management are the incidences to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. We first consider public 
insurers’ likelihood to meet prior years’ earnings. Following Gunny (2010), we define INCREASE as 
an indicator variable that equals one when the difference in the net income between periods t and t-1, 
scaled by total assets at the end of period t-1, is between 0 and 0.01, and zero otherwise. Next, we 
analyze the likelihood of public insurers to meet or beat analyst consensus earnings forecasts. 
MEET_BEAT equals one if a firm’s actual earnings per share less the most recent analyst consensus 
earnings forecast just prior to the firm’s annual earnings announcement is above zero and below 0.01, 
and zero otherwise. Specifically, we estimate the following logit regression: 
INCREASE or MEET_BEAT = β1 Post + β2 CDPAC + β3 Post*CDPAC + β4 SIZE  
+ β5 MB + β6 LEVERAGE + YEAR FE                                            (1) 
 
where Post is an indicator variable that equals one for the period 2012–2014 and zero for the period 
2009–2011, and CDPAC is the annual capitalized acquisition costs scaled by total assets. We also 
include firm size (SIZE), the market-to-book ratio (MB), firm leverage (LEVERAGE) and year fixed 
effects as controls. 
Table 4 reports the results from estimating regression model (1). The dependent variable is 
INCREASE in column (1), and MEET_BEAT in column (2). Across the two columns, we find a 
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positive and significant coefficient on CDPAC, supporting the hypothesis that public insurers use 
reporting discretion in capitalizing policy acquisition costs to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We 
find a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term of Post and CDPAC for both earnings 
management proxies, which suggests that ASU 2010-26 reduces public insurers’ discretion to 
categorize operating expenses as assets to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.13 
 
4.2 Discretionary and Nondiscretionary CDPAC 
One main challenge for our study is that the inferences of earnings management are 
confounded by the difficulty of measuring the level of deferrals absent managerial discretion 
(McNichols and Wilson 1988, McNichols 2000). We address this issue by examining the detailed data 
on the components of the acquisition costs disclosed in the statutory reports that insurers file to their 
state regulators.14 Of different types of policy acquisition expenditures, we are able to identify 
commissions, office expenses, and selling expenses from statutory filings. Sales commissions are paid 
when sales are placed, so there is less discretion involved in the accounting treatment of sales 
commissions. On the other hand, managers of public insurers have more discretion over the accounting 
treatment for agency office expenses and selling expenses especially when the threshold at which 
acquisition costs meet eligibility for deferral is lower under SFAS 60. As a first step, we investigate the 
                                                          
13 We repeat the regressions in table 4 by removing observations in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, the transition years of the 
two different accounting standards. We obtain qualitatively similar results when the dependent variable is INCREASE. The 
signs of the coefficients remain the same but the coefficients are no longer statistically significant when the dependent 
variable is MEET_BEAT, which might be a result of reduced power.  
14There are in general six categories of acquisition costs that can be capitalized under SFAS 60: sales commissions, 
producer bonuses/rewards, agency manager compensation, agency office expenses/rents, marketing expenses/product 
information, medical exams, and underwriter compensation. (See http://www.scorgloballifeamericas.com/en-
us/knowledgecenter/Pages/Forms/AllItems.aspx?Paged=TRUE&PagedPrev=TRUE&p_SortBehavior=0&p_PublishingCon
tact=James%20Addiego&p_Created=20160729%2018%3A08%3A22&p_ID=599&SortField=PublishingContact&SortDir
=Asc&PageFirstRow=151&SortField=PublishingContact&SortDir=Asc&&View=%7BA5B26658-5AB1-4518-81E2-
2BA2FD4D9732%7D) 
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weights public insurers place on different categories of acquisition costs in determining CDPAC. We 
also consider the impact of insurance premiums. Specifically, we estimate the following OLS 
regression model: 
CDPAC = β1Commission + β2 Office Exp + β3 Selling Exp + β4 ∆Premiums + β5 Post  
+ β6 Post* Commission + β7 Post* Office Exp + β8 Post* Selling Exp  
+ β9 Post*∆Premiums + YEAR FE                                                                                            (2)      
 
Table 5 shows the results of estimating regression model (2). The dependent variable is 
CDPAC in both columns. Column (1) shows the results without insurer and year fixed effects, and 
column (2) shows the results with insurer and year fixed effects. We find that the coefficient on Office 
Exp is positive and significant, suggesting that insurers tend to capitalize more discretionary 
acquisition costs before ASU 2010-26. However, the coefficient on the interaction term of Office Exp 
and Post is negative and significant, supporting the expectation that discretionary acquisition costs are 
unlikely to meet eligibility for deferral after ASU 2010-26. In contrast, the interaction term of 
Commission and Post along with that of ∆Premiums and Post are positive and significant, indicating 
that acquisition costs that are directly related to the successful acquisition of insurance contracts are 
more likely to be capitalized under ASU 2010-26. 
We expect managers of public insurers to manage earnings through the accounting treatment of 
more discretionary acquisition costs, and the effect of ASU 2010-26 to reduce earnings management to 
be more prominent in more discretionary acquisition costs. On the other hand, we expect to find non-
result for nondiscretionary acquisition costs from the pre- to the post-ASU 2010-26 period. To test this 
prediction, we estimate a prediction model of CDPAC by year as a function of changes in insurance 
premiums, which indicates the success of the insurers’ acquisition activity. This model is similar in 
spirit to the Jones’ model in estimating nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals (Jones 1991). Table 
6 Panel A presents the results of estimating the prediction model of CDPAC. Column (1) shows the 
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regression results for the period before ASU 2010-26, which finds an insignificant coefficient on 
∆Premiums. In contrast, the results in column (2) demonstrate a positive and significant coefficient on 
∆Premiums for the period after ASU 2010-26. The association between CDPAC and ∆Premiums is 
stronger after ASU 2010-26, suggesting the amount of capitalized policy acquisition costs are more 
closely linked to the success of the insurers’ operations.  
We use the predicted values from the prediction model as a proxy of nondiscretionary CDPAC, 
and the residuals as a proxy of discretionary CDPAC. We estimate the following regression models to 
test the association between insurers’ discretionary (nondiscretionary) CDPAC and earnings 
management measures: 
INCREASE or MEET_BEAT = β1 Post + β2 Discretionary CDPAC  
+ β3 Post* Discretionary CDPAC + β4 SIZE + β5 MB + β6 LEVERAGE + YEAR FE 
                                                                                                                                      (3.1) 
  
INCREASE or MEET_BEAT = β1 Post + β2 Nondiscretionary CDPAC  
+ β3 Post* Nondiscretionary CDPAC + β4 SIZE + β5 MB + β6 LEVERAGE  
+ YEAR FE                                                                                                                          (3.2) 
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results from running regression models (3.1) and (3.2). The 
dependent variable is INCREASE in columns (1) and (3), and MEET_BEAT in columns (2) and (4). 
Consistent with our expectation, we do not find statistically significant coefficients on the interaction 
term of Post and Nondiscretionary CDPAC across the first two columns.15 However, columns (3) and 
(4) find that the coefficient on Discretionary CDPAC is positive and significant, and the interaction 
term of Post and Discretionary CDPAC is negative and significant. The contrasting results between 
using Nondiscretionary CDPAC and Discretionary CDPAC provide support that managers of public 
insurers using reporting discretion to manage earnings but that accounting standards that provide 
                                                          
15 We note that the positive and significant coefficient on Nondiscretionary CDPAC in column (1) might capture the 
mechanical relation between INCREASE and ∆Premiums. We do not observe a similar result when MEET_BEAT is the 
dependent variable in column (2). 
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guidance in practice could deter insurers from managing earnings.  
 
4.3 Private Insurance Companies and Life Insurance Companies 
Next, we conduct a falsification test using private insurers to address the concern that our 
results on public insurers are not attributable to earnings management, but simply a reflection of the 
underlying earnings distribution. We argue that private insurers face less capital market pressure 
relative to public insurers because public insurers’ shareholders are more likely than private insurers’ 
shareholders to rely on simple earnings benchmarks to evaluate firm performance (Beatty, Ke and 
Petroni 2002). Therefore, managers of public insurers are more likely to exercise discretion to manage 
earnings through the accounting treatment on policy acquisition costs.   
Private insurers are required to follow SAP to file statutory reports to state regulators. SAP 
values insurance companies as if they were in liquidation rather than continuing in business, so it 
adopts a more conservative approach relative to GAAP, and requires insurance companies to expense 
all related policy costs rather than capitalizing them. Private insurers do not report CDPAC in the 
statutory filings, so we use two different proxies of CDPAC. The first proxy is the amount of general 
expenses, and the second is the amount of agency commissions. Private insurers do not follow GAAP, 
so we do not expect that ASU 2010-26 has effects on them. Thus, we estimate the following regression 
for private insurers:   
INCREASE = β1 Post + β2 Proxy_CDPAC+ β3 Post* Proxy_CDPAC+ β4 SIZE + β5 MB + β6 
LEVERAGE + YEAR FE                                                             (4) 
 
Table 7 reports the results from estimating regression model (4) for private insurers. Given that 
MEET_BEAT is not available for private insurers, we run regressions of INCREASE as a dependent 
variable. Columns (1) and (2) show the results when the proxies of CDPAC are general operating 
expense (General_Exp) and agent commissions (Commission), respectively. The coefficients on each 
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proxy of CDPAC and the interaction term are not statistically significant. The failure to observe 
evidence of earnings management through managing acquisition costs in private insurers indicates that 
our primary results are more likely to reflect earnings management of public insurers rather than a 
result of the underlying earning distribution of insurance companies. However, there is a caveat in 
interpreting our results because public insurers’ accounting for policy acquisition costs under GAAP is 
different from private insurers’ accounting for policy acquisition costs. The proxies of CDPAC of 
private companies used in the empirical analyses might not capture the underlying construct. 
We further explore cross-sectional differences by observing different types of insurance 
businesses. Moody’s and some comment letters state that the accounting standard impact would be 
stronger for life insurance relative to other insurance sectors.16 Given that life insurers hold longer 
duration insurance contracts than other insurers, they would have more discretion to manage earnings 
through capitalizing policy acquisition costs. Thus, we expect that the empirical results of earnings 
management through capitalizing acquisition costs would be stronger for life insurers, and that ASU 
2010-26 would have a more pronounced effect on life insurers. To investigate this possibility, we 
separately estimate regression model (1) for life insurers and other insurers, where life insurers are 
defined as holding life assets more than 67% of the overall holding company’s total assets (top tercile). 
 Table 8 reports the results from estimating regression model (1) for life insurers and other 
insurers. The regression results for life insurers are presented in columns (1) and (2). We observe 
similar results of a positive and significant coefficient on CDPAC, and a negative and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term of Post and CDPAC for the sample of life insurers. Columns (3) and 
(4) report the regression results for other insurance companies. We do not find statistically significant 
                                                          
16 https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/10/20/moodys-new-accounting-rules-alone-should-not-
impac/?slreturn=20190216125129, 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=1175827834734&blobheader=application
%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs  
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coefficients on CDPAC or the interaction term. These results support our expectation that the business 
models are different across life and other insurers. 
 
4.4 The Value Relevance of Capitalized Acquisition Costs (CDPAC)  
Finally, we investigate whether the amount of capitalized policy acquisition costs is value 
relevant for investors in order to shed some light on the incentive of earnings management. 
Following Aboody and Lev (1998), we use two different approaches to examine the value 
relevance of CDPAC: associating stock returns with contemporaneous financial data and examining 
the predictive ability of CDPAC with respect to subsequent revenues (insurance premiums). We 
conduct the value relevance tests in the pre- and post-ASU 2010-26 periods separately to examine 
the effect of reduced reporting discretion. 
The first value relevance test focuses on the association between unexpected CDPAC and 
contemporaneous annual stock returns, which measures the extent to which information reflected in 
the capitalization of policy acquisition costs is consistent with that used by investors. We estimate 
the following regression: 
  RETt  = β1 CDPACt + β2 ∆CDPACt + β3 Adj. NIt + β4 ∆ Adj. NIt + β5 PRE_CDPACt  
+ YEAR FE                    (5.1) 
 
where RETt  is the insurer’s annual stock returns, cumulated from nine month before fiscal t year-end 
through three months after it, CDPACt is the level of CDPAC at end of year t,  ∆CDPACt is the annual 
change in CDPAC, Adj. NIt is the current period adjusted annual earnings (defined as earnings before 
amortization of DAC), and ∆ Adj. NIt is the current period changes in adjusted earnings. The variable 
PRE_CDPACt is the predicted value of CDPAC for each insurer-year obtained from the annual 
regression of CDPAC on ∆Premiums. We also include year fixed effects in the regression model. 
 Our next value relevance test examines the association between CDPAC and future insurance 
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premiums. The prediction of future insurance premiums (revenues) is of significant importance to 
investors. A positive and significant association between capitalized policy acquisition costs and future 
insurance premiums provides strong evidence of value relevance. We estimate the following regression 
Premiumt+1, t+2 = β1 CDPACt + β2 Adj. NIt + YEAR FE                                             (5.2) 
 
where Premiumt+1, t+2 is one-year or two-year ahead insurance premiums. The variable of interest is 
CDPACt. We include Adj. NIt and year fixed effects in the regression model.  
The value relevance results presented in Panel A of Table 9 reports the results on estimating 
regression model (5.1). We find an insignificant coefficient on ∆CDPAC in the period before ASU 
2010-26 (column 1), and a positive and significant coefficient on ∆CDPAC in the period after ASU 
2010-26 (column 2). The results suggest that the annual capitalized amount of policy acquisition 
costs is more value relevant when reporting discretion is reduced as a result of more stringent 
accounting standards.  
Panel B displays the results on estimating regression model (5.2).  The dependent variable is 
one year ahead insurance premiums in columns (1) and (2), and two year ahead insurance 
premiums in columns (3) and (4). The results show that the amount of current period capitalized 
acquisition costs is significantly and positively associated with subsequent reported insurance 
premiums in the periods both before and after the implementation of ASU 2010-26. However, the 
coefficient on CDPAC is of higher magnitude in the period after ASU 2010-26 relative to the 
period before, and the difference in the coefficient CDPAC across the two periods is statistically 
significant. The results are consistent with the notion that the capitalization of policy acquisition 
costs under the ASU 2010-26 guidance provides more value relevant accounting information about 
the insurers’ future fundamentals. 
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5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we study whether managers of public insurers use reporting discretion in policy 
acquisition costs to manage earnings, and the extent to which accounting standards that provide 
guidance in practice could deter insurers from managing earnings.  
Acquisition costs represent expenditures that an insurer spends to sell and initiate insurance 
contracts. GAAP permits public insurers to capitalize certain costs as an asset and amortize them over 
the life of related policies in proportion to expected future gross profits. The vague language under the 
earlier accounting standards provides managers of public insurers with the discretion to determine the 
expenses eligible for deferral. We expect managers of public insurers to use this accounting flexibility 
to manage earnings by capitalizing operating costs as DAC rather than immediately expensing them. 
However, the recent accounting standard ASU 2010-26 establishes a higher threshold at which 
acquisition costs meet eligibility for deferral, so we expect this guidance to substantially reduce the 
discretion afforded to managers to categorize acquisition costs as an asset. 
We find empirical evidence that managers of public insurers manage earnings through 
capitalizing acquisition costs before ASU 2010-26 became effective, but not after ASU 2010-26. 
The results also suggest that this earnings management is achieved primarily through capitalizing 
discretionary rather than nondiscretionary acquisition costs. We additionally analyze this pattern 
separately for private insurers, and fail to detect evidence of earnings management through 
managing policy acquisition costs. Furthermore, the amount of capitalized acquisition costs is more 
significantly associated with contemporaneous stock returns and future insurance premiums in the 
period after 2010-026 relative to the period before, suggesting that capitalization of acquisition 
costs under the ASU 2010-26 guidance results in more value relevant accounting information 
Collectively, our paper documents empirical evidence suggesting that managers of public 
26 
 
insurers manage earnings through capitalizing rather than expensing acquisition costs, and that 
accounting standards that limit such discretion can help reduce this pattern of earnings management 
and increase the relevance of the accounting information. The empirical evidence from the value 
relevance analyses is more consistent with the view that the use of discretion to manage earnings 
through capitalizing acquisition costs captures opportunistic reporting behavior. Our study 
contributes to the earnings management literature by providing direct empirical evidence of 
earnings management through a specific accounting choice – whether to capitalize or expense 
operating costs.    
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Adjusted NI Adjusted annual net income of firm (i.e. reported income plus amortization of 
DAC), scaled by total assets. Obtained from Compustat. 
BVPS Book value of equity per share minus the capitalized software asset per share at 
year-end  
Book value of equity per share. Obtained from Compustat. 
CDPAC Capitalized deferred policy acquisition costs scaled by total assets. This item 
represents policy acquisition costs capitalized in the current period for recovery 
future periods. Policy acquisition costs such as agent's commissions, 
underwriting expenses, medical fees, and marketing expenses are deferred and 
amortized over future periods as a method of matching revenues and expenses. 
Obtained from Compustat. 
CDPAC_PS CDPAC per share. Obtained from Compustat. 
Commission Agent commissions paid, scaled by total assets. Net commission and brokerage 
expense are the sum of direct, excluding contingent expense, reinsurance 
assumed, excluding contingent expense, contingent-direct expense, contingent-
reinsurance assumed, and policy and membership fees. Obtained from SNL 
Financial data. 
Discretionary CDPAC 
(the residual) 
Residual values from a regression model that uses ∆ Premiums and commissions 
to predict CDPAC. 
EPS Earnings per share. Obtained from Compustat. 
General_Exp Insurance general expenses paid during year, scaled by total assets. Obtained 
from SNL Financial data. 
INCREASE Similar to Srinidhi et al. (2011), Frankel, et al. (2002) and Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), we define INCREASE as an indicator variable that takes a value of one 
when the difference in the net income between periods t and (t-1), scaled by 
beginning of year total assets (t-1) falls in the interval (0, 0.01), and zero 
otherwise.  
LEVERAGE Total Liabilities scaled by total assets. Obtained from Compustat.  
MB Market-to-Book. Calculated as [Total Assets (AT) - Common Shareholders' 
Equity (CEQ) + Common Shares Outstanding * Price Close (CSHO*PRCC_f)], 
scaled by total assets. Obtained from Compustat.  
MEET_BEAT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the reported I/B/E/S actual earnings per share 
(EPS) less the last consensus analyst EPS forecast immediately preceding firm's 
annual earnings announcement date falls in the interval (0, 0.01), and zero 
otherwise. 
NI Net Income scaled by total assets. Obtained from Compustat. 
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Nondiscretionary 
CDPAC (the predicted 
value) 
Predicted values from a regression model that uses ∆ Premiums and commissions 
to predict CDPAC. 
Office Exp. General office expenses (ex. Rental expense) and depreciation expense, scaled by 
total assets. Obtained from SNL Financial data. 
POST An indicator variable equal to 1 for the post-transition period, and 0 for the pre-
transition period. POST is 0 for fiscal years 2009–2011 and 1 for 2012–2014.   
∆Premiums  Changes in insurers’ premiums earned, scaled by total assets. Obtained from 
SNL Financial data. 
Selling Exp. Selling expense (ex. Advertising, traveling expenses), scaled by total assets.  
Obtained from SNL Financial data. 
SIZE Log of total assets. Obtained from Compustat. 
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Table 1:  Sample Selection  
 
This table details the sample selection process discussed in Section 3 and the number of 
observations in each step. 
 
 
Description Firms Firm-Year 
Firms with non-missing DFPAC (Deferred Policy Acquisition 
Costs), 2009-2014 
137 699 
Delete missing CDPAC after hand collecting from company's 
filings 
-12 -76 
Delete other missing information (ex. Net income, Total Asset) 0 -18 
Main Sample: 125 605  
-33 -151 
Statutory Sample: 92 454 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Total Sample 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 1st Pctl 25th 
Pctl 
Median 75th Pctl 99th Pctl 
CDPAC 605 0.020 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.032 0.118 
NI 605 0.018 0.043 -0.141 0.006 0.017 0.033 0.113 
MB 605 0.767 0.116 0.504 0.689 0.769 0.854 0.976 
LEVERAGE 605 0.757 0.122 0.443 0.685 0.763 0.849 0.965 
SIZE 605 9.190 1.727 5.917 7.908 9.086 10.208 13.224 
INCREASE 605 0.337 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MEET_BEAT 542 0.046 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
∆ Premiums  454 0.197 0.200 0.006 0.076 0.153 0.247 1.089 
Commission  454 0.046 0.056 0.000 0.010 0.027 0.058 0.304 
Office Exp. 454 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.060 
Selling Exp. 454 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.014 
Discretionary 
CDPAC  
(the residual) 
454 0.000 0.026 -0.078 -0.015 -0.006 0.012 0.082 
Nondiscretionary 
CDPAC  
(the predicted value) 
454 0.024 0.016 0.005 0.015 0.019 0.026 0.088 
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Panel B: Correlation Table  
 
This table reports the pairwise correlation table with Spearman in upper diagonal and Pearson in lower diagonal. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A, and continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Numbers in bold indicate statistical 
significance at least at the 5% level.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CDPAC 1             
 
 
             
               
(2) NI 0.150 1            
 
 
(0.00)             
               
(3) MB -0.350 -0.410 1           
 
 
(0.00) (0.00)            
               
(4) LEVERAGE -0.360 -0.410 0.940 1          
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
               
(5) SIZE -0.370 -0.110 0.610 0.570 1         
 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)          
               
(6) INCREASE -0.110 0.0500 0.160 0.130 0.200 1        
  (0.02) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
               
(7) MEET_BEAT 0.0400 0 0.0200 0.0300 -0.0600 0.0500 1       
  (0.38) (0.94) (0.66) (0.48) (0.22) (0.33)        
              
(8) ∆ Premiums  0.320 0.180 -0.410 -0.410 -0.410 -0.110 -0.0200 1      
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.62)       
 
 
             
(9) Commission 0.400 0.180 -0.420 -0.410 -0.430 -0.140 0 0.720 1     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.00)      
              
(10) Office Exp. 0.410 0.110 -0.390 -0.410 -0.400 -0.120 -0.0200 0.700 0.860 1    
 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00)     
 
 
             
(11) Selling Exp. 0.310 0.170 -0.310 -0.330 -0.260 -0.0800 -0.0600 0.540 0.650 0.760 1   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
               
(12) 
Discretionary CDPAC  
(the residual) 0.840 0.0300 -0.170 -0.180 -0.150 -0.0400 0.0700 -0.0100 0 0 0 1  
 
 
(0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.18) (0.76) (0.95) (1.00) (1.00)   
 
              
(13) 
Nondiscretionary CDPAC 
(the predicted value) 0.540 0.220 -0.380 -0.390 -0.450 -0.140 -0.0200 0.620 0.750 0.770 0.590 0 1 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00)  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Pre and Post- ASU 2010-26 standard periods 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for pre- and post- ASU 2010-26 sample periods. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels. See Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
 
PRE ASU 2010-26    POST ASU 2010-26  Difference 
in Median   
Difference 
in Means  
Variable 
N Mean Std Dev Median 
  
N Mean Std Dev Median POST - 
PRE   
POST - 
PRE  
CDPAC 312 0.020 0.027 0.008  293 0.020 0.027 0.006 -0.002  0.007  
NI 312 0.017 0.048 0.016  293 0.019 0.037 0.018 0.001  0.02  
MB 312 0.762 0.120 0.765  293 0.772 0.113 0.781 0.015 ** -0.649  
LEVERAGE 312 0.754 0.125 0.761  293 0.760 0.119 0.768 0.007  -0.635  
SIZE 312 9.089 1.680 8.989  293 9.298 1.773 9.243 0.254 ** -7.316  
INCREASE 312 0.298 0.458 0.000  293 0.379 0.486 0.000 0.000 ** 0.188 ** 
MEET_BEAT 284 0.060 0.238 0.000  258 0.031 0.174 0.000 0.000  0.114  
∆ Premium  221 0.200 0.196 0.151  233 0.195 0.204 0.154 0.004  -0.005  
Commission  221 0.047 0.058 0.028  233 0.046 0.055 0.026 -0.001  -0.001  
Office Exp. 221 0.009 0.011 0.005  233 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.000  0.000  
Selling Exp. 221 0.003 0.003 0.001  233 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000  0.000  
Discretionary 
CDPAC  
(the residual) 
221 0.000 0.026 -0.006 
 
233 0.000 0.026 -0.005 0.001 0.000 
 
Nondiscretionary 
CDPAC  
(the predicted value) 
221 0.024 0.018 0.019 
 
233 0.024 0.015 0.019 0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Effects of ASU 2010-26 on Insurance Firms’ Incentive to Engage in Earnings 
Management 
 
This table presents regression results from the estimation of Equation (1), which examines 
Hypotheses 1a and b. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses.  
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-
tailed test). 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES INCREASE MEET_BEAT 
      
Post 0.163*** 0.025 
 (0.057) (0.047) 
CDPAC 1.536* 0.841* 
 (0.933) (0.461) 
Post*CDPAC -3.391*** -0.979* 
  (1.254) (0.562) 
SIZE 0.043*** -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.009) 
MB 0.569 -2.959 
 (0.602) (2.724) 
LEVERAGE -0.108 3.148 
 (0.568) (2.702) 
   
   
Observations 605 456 
Year FE YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.0818 0.0673 
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Table 5: Weights Placed on Different Categories of Acquisition Costs in Determining 
CPDAC  
 
This table presents regression results from the estimation of Equation (2). See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES CDPAC CDPAC 
      
Commission -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.056) (0.102) 
Post*Commission 0.166* 0.165* 
  (0.091) (0.097) 
Office Exp. 1.362*** 1.347** 
 (0.349) (0.550) 
Post*Office Exp. -1.505*** -1.484** 
  (0.551) (0.591) 
Selling Exp. -0.474 -0.396 
 (1.026) (1.142) 
Post*Selling Exp. 1.258 1.171 
  (1.387) (1.137) 
∆Premiums 0.079 0.092** 
 (0.058) (0.043) 
Post*∆Premiums 0.165** 0.152 
  (0.074) (0.102) 
Post -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
   
Observations 454 454 
R-squared 0.255 0.256 
Firm FE NO YES 
Adj R2 0.240 0.234 
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Table 6: Discretionary and Nondiscretionary CDPAC 
 
Panel A: The Prediction Model of CDPAC 
 
This table presents regression results from estimating CDPAC on ∆Premiums. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
 Pre-Period Post-Period 
VARIABLES CDPAC CDPAC 
      
∆Premiums 0.103 0.317*** 
  (0.081) (0.083) 
 
  
Observations 233 221 
Firm FE YES YES 
Adj R2 -0.00104 0.176 
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Panel B: Earnings Management 
 
This table reports the results from running regression models (3.1) and (3.2). See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES INCREASE MEET_BEAT INCREASE MEET_BEAT 
     
Post 0.269 -0.053 0.069 0.036 
 (0.181) (0.109) (0.064) (0.052) 
Nondiscretionary CDPAC*Post -8.797 3.242    (8.646) (3.873)   
Nondiscretionary CDPAC 0.632*** -0.054   
 (0.211) (0.078)   
Discretionary CDPAC*Post   -2.912** -0.965*    (1.308) (0.509) 
Discretionary CDPAC   0.578*** 0.937***  
  (0.223) (0.017) 
SIZE 0.040** -0.018* 0.040** -0.016 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) 
MB 0.747* -4.065 0.813** -5.221 
 (0.396) (5.082) (0.406) (5.822) 
LEVERAGE -0.544 4.292 -0.586 5.535 
 (0.379) (5.105) (0.379) (5.844) 
 
    
Observations 454 350 454 350 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.0704 0.0698 0.0738 0.0749 
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Table 7:  Private Insurers 
 
This table presents regression results from the estimation of Equation (4) for private insurers. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES INCREASE INCREASE 
   
Post 0.115*** 0.102*** 
 -0.037 -0.037 
General_Exp -0.443  
 -0.635  
Post*General_Exp -1.313  
  -0.882  
Commission  -0.545 
  -0.337 
Post*Commission  -0.546 
   -0.437 
SIZE 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 -0.006 -0.006 
LEVERAGE 0.172** 0.134* 
 -0.074 -0.069 
   
Observations 1,677 1,677 
Year FE YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.0644 0.0673 
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Table 8: Cross-sectional Analyses   
 
We categorize firms to be life insurance firms if a firm’s life assets consist of more than 67% of 
its total assets (life assets > 67% of total assets) and categorize firms to be non-life insurance 
firms if a firm’s life assets consist of less than 67% of its total assets (life assets < 67% of total 
assets). We then estimate Equation (1) for life and non-life insurance firms. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
  Life Insurers Non-Life Insurers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES INCREASE MEET_BEAT INCREASE MEET_BEAT 
          
Post 0.103 0.185 0.186*** -0.017 
 -0.108 -0.17 -0.068 -0.037 
CDPAC 3.998* 2.465** 0.548 0.42 
 -2.4 -1.197 -0.959 -0.358 
Post*CDPAC -10.995*** -2.313 -1.827 -0.541 
  -3.279 -1.448 -1.418 -0.399 
SIZE 0.028 0.003 0.042*** -0.013 
 -0.025 -0.02 -0.015 -0.01 
MB 0.769 -14.944 0.632 -0.826 
 -1.618 -9.636 -0.42 -1.654 
LEVERAGE 0.334 14.91 -0.653 0.965 
 -1.416 -9.647 -0.409 -1.629 
     
     
Observations 193 143 412 313 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.195 0.107 0.0694 0.0882 
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Table 9: Value Relevance of CDPAC 
 
Panel A. Annual Stock Returns 
This table presents regression results from the estimation of regression equation (5.1), which 
estimates firm’s annual return on CDPAC and other control variables. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
  (1) (2) 
 Pre-Period Post-Period 
VARIABLES Annual Stock Return Annual Stock Return 
      
CDPAC -5.463*** -0.325 
 (1.563) (0.628) 
ΔCDPAC -2.066 6.162** 
  (6.477) (2.994) 
AdjustedNI -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔAdjustedNI -4.721 1.121 
 (2.957) (1.326) 
PRED_CDPAC -44.584 4.385 
 (28.846) (2.775) 
   
Observations 200 185 
Firm FE YES YES 
Adj R2 0.221 0.233 
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Panel B. Future Insurance Premium 
 
This table presents regression results from the estimation of regression equation (5.3), which 
examines firm’s future (t+1) and (t+2) premium levels pre- and post- periods. See Appendix A 
for variable definitions. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Post-Period 
VARIABLES Premiumt+1 Premiumt+1 Premiumt+2 Premiumt+2 
        
CDPAC 1.400*** 1.838*** 1.424*** 1.950*** 
  (0.422) (0.406) (0.458) (0.412) 
Adjusted NI 1.399*** 1.726*** 1.730*** 2.155*** 
 (0.404) (0.427) (0.516) (0.464) 
      
Observations 210 201 200 189 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Adj R2 0.481 0.613 0.466 0.660 
 
